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Sammendrag 
Studier av intensive programmer som fremmer tidlig læring har vist gode effekter på utviklingen til 
barn fra vanskeligstilte familier. Imidlertid vet vi mindre om hvordan store, universelle 
læringsprogrammer påvirker barns utvikling. Vi tar utgangspunkt i Reform 97, en reform som gjorde 
det obligatorisk for seksåringene å starte på skolen i et førskolelignende program som vektla læring 
gjennom lek. Bakgrunnen for å innføre skolestart for seksåringene var at man ville gi alle barn et 
likeverdig pedagogisk tilbud uavhengig av bosted og sosioøkonomisk bakgrunn. Vi studerer effektene 
av reformen på barns senere karakterer når de går ut av ungdomsskolen. Vi ser også på om reformen 
påvirket barnas sannsynlighet for å fullføre videregående på normert tid, eller om den førte til at flere 
valgte akademisk spesialisering.  
 
Fordi de fleste allerede fulgte et førskoletilbud i barnehagene eller på skolen, og slik ikke opplevde 
noen stor forskjell før og etter reformen, estimerer vi effekten på den lille gruppen som ikke hadde noe 
førskoletilbud før 1997. Selv om mange av disse barna kom fra familier med lav inntekt og lav 
utdanning, finner vi at tidligere skolestart påvirket deres utvikling i svært liten grad. Vi gjør en rekke 
tester, og finner at resultatene våre er robuste.  På bakgrunn av andre funn i litteraturen om tidlig 
læring er en mulig årsak til de manglende positive effektene av tidligere skolestart at programmet var 
lite intensivt og strukturert. 
1 Introduction
Recent research suggests that universally available child care of high quality can have a
beneficial impact on children’s development, also in the long run.1 Such early childhood
interventions are found to have particularly high returns for children from disadvantaged
families.2 At the same time, children from disadvantaged families are underrepresented in
existing universally available programs. Such sorting into the existing programs coupled
with particularly large estimated benefits among disadvantaged children, suggests a po-
tentially strong social gradient in expanding or mandating early childhood interventions
(Barnett and Belfield, 2006). Indeed, in an eﬀort to counter diﬀerences at school entry
depending on social background, many countries are currently moving towards subsidized
kindergarten or child care available for the general population.3
Policies and proposals promoting universal interventions in early child care pose a
challenge to the existing literature, which has reserved most of its attention for programs
targeted at disadvantaged children. While a handful of recent studies consider large-scale
early childhood interventions (Baker, Gruber, and Milligan, 2008; Havnes and Mogstad,
2011b), these usually exploit the introduction of programs or diﬀerences in local availabil-
ity for exogenous variation. The estimates in these studies therefore derive largely from
children in families that are early adopters of child care, revealing a strong preference
for out-of-home care. Since both theory and evidence point towards important hetero-
geneity in the eﬀects of early childhood interventions (see e.g. Blau and Currie, 2006;
Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach, 2010; Havnes and Mogstad, 2010), it remains an open
question how well the current evidence can inform about the impact of truly universal
interventions.
In the current paper, we provide first evidence on the long-run eﬀect on schooling of
mandating kindergarten at age 5–6. Specifically, we first consider the impact on children’s
school performance at the end of compulsory schooling at age 15–16. To uncover eﬀects
that may not be revealed in measures of school performance, we also consider the im-
pact on high school dropout and on enrollment in the academic track in upper secondary
school. Our identifying variation comes from a 1997-reform in Norway that lowered school
starting-age from 7 to 6. The goal of the reform was to counter diﬀerences in learning out-
1For recent reviews of this rapidly expanding literature, see Almond and Currie (2010); Ruhm and
Waldfogel (2011), or Baker (2011).
2Havnes and Mogstad (2010) document large heterogeneity in the eﬀects on adult outcomes from child
care for 3–6 year old children in the late 1970s in Norway. Ludwig and Miller (2007) interpret the eﬀects
of the US Head Start as an upper bound because children are among the most disadvantaged. Further,
eﬀects found in the targeted Perry Preschool project (e.g. Karoly, Kilburn, and Cannon, 2005) are larger
than what could plausibly be expected in the general population.
3For instance, the European Union Commission proclaims that early childhood education and care “is
the essential foundation for successful lifelong learning, social integration, personal development and later
employability” (European Union, 2011, p. 1). In their 2002 Barcelona Declaration, the European Union
aims “to provide childcare by 2010 to at least 90 % of children between 3 years old and the mandatory
school age and at least 33 % of children under 3 years of age” (European Union, 2002, p. 13).
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comes between children from diﬀerent socioeconomic backgrounds. While disadvantaged
children were thought to benefit most from kindergarten programs, they were strongly
underrepresented in the existing voluntary programs prior to the reform. The activities
in the new program were aimed to prepare children for school by learning through play,
similar to activities previously oﬀered in voluntary kindergarten programs.
An advantage of our study is that access to kindergarten was not rationed prior to the
reform. Before 1997, the majority of six year olds were enrolled in subsidized child care
institutions, while the remaining children were mainly cared for by a parent (Norwegian
Ministry of Child and Family Aﬀairs, 1996). This first implies that parental care is
the dominant counterfactual mode of care, as opposed to the alternative informal non-
parental care. In comparison, it is often diﬃcult to disentangle whether previous estimates
of the eﬀect of kindergarten and child care programs mostly reflect shifts from parental
care or shifts from informal care.4 Second, since kindergarten is not rationed prior to
mandating, the estimated eﬀect derives from the particular group of children that do
not voluntarily enroll. This implies that there is little risk of confounding estimates
of mandating kindergarten from eﬀects of admitting children that are merely rationed.
We are to our knowledge the first to study the eﬀects of kindergarten enrollment on
this particular group. Our paper therefore also speaks to the broader debate on state
interventions in private decision-making.
Our baseline empirical strategy is based on a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) approach.
Ideally, we want to compare outcomes before and after the implementation of the manda-
tory kindergarten reform, of children who enroll in voluntary kindergarten at age six (i.e.
the control group) and children who do not enroll in voluntary kindergarten at age six
(i.e. the treatment group). After the reform, this is unobservable, however, since all
children are enrolled at age six. Instead, we use enrollment in kindergarten at age five to
determine treatment. This should be a good proxy since most children who are enrolled
in kindergarten at age five are also enrolled at age six. The validity of our DD strategy
hinges on the assumption that the trend in school performance among children who do
not voluntarily enroll in kindergarten would have been the same as for children who volun-
tarily do enroll in kindergarten, in the absence of mandating. The richness of our registry
data allows us to condition on a large set of observable characteristics, and to challenge
the plausibility of our identification strategy in a number of ways. In order to focus on
the particular issue of mandating and rationing, we base our analysis on children from
non-immigrant families, which constitute about 96% of the population. Our paper does
not, therefore, speak to the debate on early interventions to provide language training
among non-native speakers.
4For instance, Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) interpret their estimates to reflect about one third
shifts from parental care to formal care and two thirds shifts from informal care to formal care. In
contrast, Havnes and Mogstad (2011b) interpret their estimates as reflecting 96 % shifts from informal
care.
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Results suggest that extending the reach of kindergarten in the general population
by making it compulsory, does little to counter diﬀerences in learning outcomes between
children from diﬀerent socioeconomic backgrounds when access to kindergarten is sub-
stantial. In our baseline estimation, the estimated eﬀect on the child’s grade is negative
but below 2 % of a standard deviation. Meanwhile, we find a modest increase in high
school dropout rates, and no impact on academic tracking in upper secondary school.
Of course, mean impact estimations always risk masking potentially substantial but
counteracting eﬀects in diﬀerent parts of the population, or over the distribution of the
outcome. To address this, we first estimate eﬀects in a large number of subsamples,
reflecting the child’s gender, birth order and number of siblings; as well as parental ed-
ucation, income, welfare dependence, and age at first birth. While sometimes imprecise,
estimates across subsamples are generally small, confirming our main findings. Second,
we estimate the impact of the reform on diﬀerent segments of the grading distribution,
again finding no evidence of important heterogeneity.
To improve our confidence in the estimates, and to explore alternative channels by
which an eﬀect may work, we challenge our empirical approach in diﬀerent ways. First,
we confront the key identifying assumption of a common trend between the treatment
and comparison group underlying all DD estimation. Second, we consider whether there
may be a separate eﬀect of the reform on our comparison group that may attenuate eﬀects
on our treatment group. Third, we investigate whether there might be a delayed eﬀect
of the reform on later cohorts. Fourth, we consider some alternative and less aggregated
school outcomes to understand whether there may be eﬀects on some particular sets of
skills that are washed out in our aggregated measure of school performance. Finally, we
investigate whether the reform may have had an eﬀect on the labor supply of mothers,
estimating eﬀects on both the extensive and the intensive margin.
Three alternative explanations for the weak eﬀect of the reform stand out. On the
one hand, the results may suggest that parents sort relatively eﬃciently into the existing
kindergarten programs, so that children that are not in such programs in fact may opt
out partly because they will benefit little. Second, the results may suggest that the
children aﬀected by the program are too old to benefit, and that universal programs
must start at earlier ages. In both cases, our results would suggest that to universalize
kindergarten at age 5–6 is a misguided strategy for improving outcomes of disadvantaged
children. However, the weak eﬀect could also imply that it was the particular program
that failed to generate benefits. This could suggest that the focus on learning through
play, emphasized in the implemented program, is not successful in generating learning
gains in this group of children.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss relevant literature in Section 2. We
then proceed to discuss our analysis of the 1997-reform in Section 3, starting with the
institutional background before turning to the details of our empirical approach. Section
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4 describes our data and gives descriptive statistics, before Section 5 presents our main
results. Section 6 presents a battery of specification checks and investigates potential
mechanisms, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Early childhood interventions and child outcomes
A large and rapidly increasing literature on early childhood intervention suggests that
investments in early childhood have high returns, particularly for disadvantaged children
(Almond and Currie, 2010).5 However, most studies have focused on targeted interven-
tions, oﬀered to children from particularly disadvantaged families.6 As noted by Baker
(2011), the evidence base for universally available large-scale programs is still small. There
are several reasons why eﬀects from programs targeted at disadvantaged children could
diﬀer importantly from more universal programs. First, the eﬀect of such programs are
related to the alternative mode of care had the programs not been in place. Since disad-
vantaged children would be expected to have poorer alternatives, they likely have more to
gain from interventions (Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, and Shonkoﬀ, 2006). Second, the
targeted interventions that have been studied are often quite intensive, including home
visits, nutritional advice and several years of daily activities. In comparison, a program
serving a large part of the population will necessarily have to provide a less intensive
intervention. This might produce eﬀects from large-scale and universal programs that
diﬀer distinctly from the eﬀects of intensive small-scale interventions.7
Findings from the existing studies of universally available large-scale programs are
mixed. Evidence from a large expansion of universal child care in Canada points towards
a negative impact on child outcomes in the short run: Baker, Gruber, and Milligan
(2008) report negative mean impacts on behavior, while Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008) find
negative eﬀects for cognitive outcomes. Gupta and Simonsen (2010) exploit municipality
diﬀerences in guaranteed access to child care centers. They find that compared to parental
5Studies in neuroscience and development psychology indicate that learning is easier in early childhood
than later in life (Shonkoﬀ, Phillips, and Council, 2000). In the economics literature, Becker (1964) points
out that the returns to investments in early childhood are likely to be relatively high, simply because of
the long time to reap the rewards, while Carneiro and Heckman (2003) argue that investments in human
capital have dynamic complementarities, implying that learning begets learning.
6The Perry Preschool and Abecedarian programs are examples of targeted randomized programs (see
Barnett (1995) and Karoly, Kilburn, and Cannon (2005) for surveys of the literature.), while the US
Head Start program provides an example of a targeted non-randomized program (see e.g. Currie (2001)
or McKey, Condelli, Ganson, Barrett, McConkey, and Plantz (1985) for a review of the findings).
7See Baker (2011) for a thorough discussion. Our paper also relates to the literature on early enrollment
into formal schooling (see e.g. Leuven, Lindahl, Oosterbeek, and Webbink (2010) or Black, Devereux, and
Salvanes (2011) for an overview). An important issue in this literature has been to resolve the collinearity
of age at test and age at school start. This is not an issue in our case, since age at test is both common
across treatment groups and unaﬀected by the reform. However, the literature on child care and early
childhood interventions may in general be said to face a similar collinearity been age at program start
and years of enrollment. As in the rest of the literature, we estimate the combined eﬀect of an additional
year in kindergarten and lower age of entry.
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home care, being enrolled in a child care center at age three did not improve non-cognitive
child outcomes at age seven. However, longer hours in non-parental care lead to poorer
child outcomes.
In contrast, Fitzpatrick (2008) finds modest increases in test scores (12 percent of a
standard deviation) for disadvantaged children in less densely populated areas following
a large expansion in Universal Pre-K in Georgia. In the same vein, Havnes and Mogstad
(2010) find strong, positive eﬀects for a number of long-run adult outcomes when exploring
an increase in the availability of child care for three to six year olds in Norway in the 1970s.
The eﬀects are particularly strong for children from disadvantaged families. Similarly,
comparing siblings in Uruguay following a rapid expansion in the supply of kindergarten
places, Berlinski, Galiani, and Manacorda (2008) find an increase in years of education and
in the likelihood of being in school, with the strongest eﬀects for children of low-educated
mothers. Meanwhile, Cascio (2009) finds a decrease in subsequent high school drop out
rates and in the likelihood of being institutionalized for white children, but no such eﬀect
for blacks,8 when exploiting the variation in kindergarten subsidies across diﬀerent states
in the US from the 1960s.
As emphasized by Blau and Currie (2006), the expected eﬀect of a child care inter-
vention depends crucially on the alternative mode of care, usually parental care in the
home (parental care) or informal sources of non-parental care (informal care).9 A shift
into formal care from informal care, often of low quality, may be expected to yield benefits
for children (see e.g. Havnes and Mogstad, 2011b). Meanwhile, the alternative shift from
parental care may potentially be less beneficial.10
Unfortunately, existing evidence is often unable to disentangle which shifts are most
relevant for the interventions. This is one potential explanation for the seemingly con-
tradicting eﬀects found in parts of the literature. Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008),
for instance, note that about a third of the children enrolling in child care after the ex-
pansion were shifted from informal sources of care. The eﬀect they estimate should be a
mix, therefore, two thirds of the eﬀect of moving children from parental care to formal
care, and one third the eﬀect of moving children from informal care to formal care. In
comparison, the estimates in Havnes and Mogstad (2010; 2011b) can be interpreted as
being driven almost solely by shifts from informal to formal out-of-home care. It should
therefore not necessarily come as a surprise that the eﬀects in the latter studies paint
a brighter picture of how child care aﬀects children’s outcomes than do those in Baker,
8Cascio (2009) argues that this is likely due to the fact that the new program crowded out investments
in federally funded early education among the poorest five year olds.
9Informal care refers to care by an unlicensed, usually untrained, caretaker. Informal care can be both
paid and unpaid, and usually take place in the child’s home or in the home of the caretaker. Examples
are nannys, neighbors, relatives, or unlicensed child-minders.
10Gupta and Simonsen (2010) can distinguish between the shift from parental care to formal care and
from parental care to informal care. They report no eﬀect on child outcomes of shifts from home care to
formal care, but a negative eﬀect of shifts from home care to informal care for disadvantaged boys.
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Gruber, and Milligan (2008).
As emphasized by Baker (2011) we need more evidence on the impacts of programs
that serve large parts of the population. Our paper adds to this literature in two distinct
ways. First, from extensive studies conducted prior to the reform, we can be confident that
we estimate the eﬀect mostly of shifts from parental care. While some studies have been
able to plausibly isolate eﬀects from shifting children from informal care (e.g. Havnes and
Mogstad, 2011b), we are not aware of studies that isolate the shift from parental care to
formal care. Second, since kindergarten is not rationed prior to mandating, the estimated
eﬀect should derive from the particular group of children that do not voluntarily enroll.
We are to our knowledge the first to study the eﬀects of kindergarten on this particular
group.
3 Analyzing the 1997 compulsory schooling law
3.1 Background
Until 1997, Norwegian children started school in August the year they turned seven. This
was late compared to children in most western countries.11 At the same time, slots in
child care institutions were widely available following a child care reform in 1975. In 1996,
89 % of non-immigrant families enrolled their six year olds in a kindergarten program.12
However, from the mid-1980s, there was widespread worry that children entered school
on diﬀerent footings, depending on their socioeconomic background.
Figure 1 shows the strong social gradient in school performance and kindergarten
enrollment. In Panel (a), we draw the average grade of students at exams administered at
the end of compulsory school, in the deciles of family income at age five. The figure shows
a strong positive relationship between the two: On average, children in the lowest decile,
with family income of about USD 16,000, receive a grade of less than 3.5, while children
in the upper decile, with family income of about USD 170,000, receive a grade of almost
4.5.13 This diﬀerence in exam performance is equivalent to a diﬀerence of just under one
standard deviation (cf. Table 2 below). At the same time, children in lower deciles have
a much lower probability of being enrolled in kindergarten. Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows
that enrollment in kindergarten at age five among children in the lowest decile of family
income is just over 50 %, compared to over 90 % for deciles 6–10.14
While children enrolled in formal child care were oﬀered school preparation in kinder-
garten groups within their child care center, this was not available for children not enrolled
11For instance, school starting age in Germany, France and the US was six, while England had a starting
age of five.
12For simplicity, we use age a to refer to the year the child turns a years old in the below.
13Throughout, we refer to 2011-USD adjusted using the consumer price index.
14For details, see table A1 in Appendix A.
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Figure 1: Social gradient in school performance and enrollment in kindergarten among
children born in 1990.
Notes: Family income is measured in 1996, when the child is five years old, adjusted for CPI-growth, and converted to
USD using USD/NOK = 6. Average exam grade and enrollment in kindergarten refers to the mean among children from
families with income in each decile of the distribution of family income. Data and variable definitions are in Section 4.
in formal child care.15 On this background, a proposal to lower the mandatory school
starting age from seven to six was widely discussed. Compulsory programs for six year
olds, as opposed to voluntary kindergarten programs, would expose all children to the
same educational program, and was argued to counter diﬀerences in learning outcomes
between children from diﬀerent socioeconomic backgrounds. A reform was finally pro-
posed in a government White Paper published in the spring of 1993 (Norwegian Ministry
of Education, 1992-93), and passed the Norwegian Parliament in May 1994 (Norwegian
Ministry of Education, 1993-94). The reform was implemented in August 1997, at the
start of the 1997–1998 school year. The first children aﬀected were those born in 1991,
who started school in August 1997, the year they turned six years old. The document
refers to the fact that 80 % of children were enrolled in a kindergarten program on a
voluntary basis (in 1993), either in school or integrated into a child care center.
Note that the cutoﬀ for school starting age in Norway is January 1st. In Norway, as
in most of Europe, schools employ strict enrollment rules, and nearly all children start
school the year they turn the school starting age. Any exemption from this rule requires
a formal application from the parents which then has to be approved by specialists and
decided upon by the local government.
Educational content. To facilitate the comparison of the kindergarten programs before
and after the 1997-reform, Table 1 summarizes some important characteristics of the
15Voluntary programs for six year olds were allowed on school grounds from 1991, managed by kinder-
garten teachers (Norwegian Ministry of Education, 1990-91, Ot.prp. nr. 57). Government support was
the same as for six year olds enrolled in kindergarten, and the parental co-payment and educational
content of the program was essentially the same as that oﬀered in regular child care institutions. In the
remainder, we do not distinguish between the two, as we cannot identify in which program a particular
child was enrolled.
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Table 1: Characteristics of kindergarten programs before and after the 1997-reform.
Pre-reform Post-reform
Adults in a group with 20
children
Two kindergarten teachers Two kindergarten teachers
Structured learning
activities
Learning through play
integrated into primary
schools or child care
centers
Learning through play
four hours/day
Other activities Free play (supervised) in
the child care center or
the after-school program
Free play (supervised) in
the after-school program
Peers Three to six years old Six years old in
kindergarten, six to nine
years old in the
after-school program
Payment 290–630 USD/month
depending on income
170 USD/month on
average (given enrollment
in an after-school
program)
State subsidies 4,600 USD/year 4,100-4,700 USD/year
Source: Norwegian Ministry of Education (1992-93) and Norwegian Ministry of Child and Family Aﬀairs (1995). Costs are
measured in 2011-USD.
programs, discussed further below.
The educational content of the mandatory kindergarten program was aimed at com-
bining the best of school and kindergarten traditions. These were grounded in the social
pedagogy tradition which had also dominated child care practices in subsidized child care
institutions.16 Learning through play was stated as essential, and the White Paper pre-
ceding the reform referred to research that gave little credit to formal learning for the
particular group of six year olds (Norwegian Ministry of Education, 1992-93). Kinder-
garten teachers were for the first time allowed to teach in school, and a new national
curriculum was introduced focusing on providing care and an educational environment
adapted to age and level of maturity. The curriculum for the new first graders ensured
consistent teaching goals for all six year olds across the country.17
16The social pedagogy tradition for early education has been especially influential in the Nordic coun-
tries and Central-Europe. In contrast, a so-called pre-primary pedagogic approach to early education
has dominated many English and French-speaking countries, favoring formal learning processes to meet
explicit standards for what children should know and be able to do before they start school.
17The curriculum for the remaining nine years in compulsory schooling was revised, and implemented
for grades 1, 2, 5, and 8 in 1997, grades 3, 6 and 9 in 1998 and the remaining grades in 1999 (Norwegian
Ministry of Education, 1996b). Children in our main sample, born 1990–1991, therefore were subject to
the new curriculum through primary school. The implementation was such, however, that the cohorts in
our extended sample, were introduced to the new curriculum at somewhat diﬀerent times. Specifically,
children born in 1987, 1990 and 1991 were placed on the new curriculum track at the outset of the reform
in 1997. Children born in 1988 were placed on the new curriculum track in 1998, while children born in
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The new curriculum strengthened the focus on developing social, language and physical
skills through free play and “learning-by-playing”. Play was considered to be a necessity
for young children, contributing to learning and development, and the time devoted to
play was gradually phased out as the child grew older. The new curriculum specifically
stated that “The first year [of primary school] is to have a distinct kindergarten charac-
ter, and one has to emphasize learning through play and age-mixed activities throughout
lower secondary school” (Norwegian Ministry of Education, 1996a).18 In an international
context, the program thus bears strong resemblance to a kindergarten program rather
than to a formal school program. This is important to keep in mind when interpreting
the results.
In the new mandatory kindergarten program, the minimum requirement was one
teacher or kindergarten teacher for every 18 children. By comparison, the minimum
requirement for pedagogical staﬀ in child care centers for six year olds was one per 14-18
children. Beyond this, the municipalities should themselves judge the need for further
staﬀ, but they had to secure suﬃcient care for the children (Norwegian Ministry of Child
and Family Aﬀairs, 1995). In addition to the kindergarten teacher, assistants were hired
depending on the size of the group and the municipal regulations.19
The teaching requirement for the new first graders was set to 20 hours per week
(Norwegian Ministry of Education, 1992-93). Beyond this the new first graders could
enroll in an after-school program if their parents needed further care for their child.
The after-school programs were in most cases situated on school premises. The programs
oﬀered free play under the supervision of non-qualified adults, with no educational content.
Reform costs. The costs of the reform were largely due to the added investments in
school buildings in order to house the new first graders, estimated to 891 million USD.
This amounts to about 82 million USD per year. In addition, there were costs associated
with developing and purchasing books for the new curriculum, additional teaching re-
sources, school transportation and after-school programs each year (Norwegian Ministry
of Regional Aﬀairs, 1995-96).
The counterfactual mode of care. Parental care seems to be the alternative for the vast
majority of six year-old children not enrolled in a kindergarten program. Families who
wanted to enroll their six year-old in kindergarten faced little rationing in the years just
1989 were placed on the new track only in 1999, when they were in the fourth grade.
18To ensure the care of six year olds during normal work hours but outside school hours, the gov-
ernment also expanded the access to after-school programs. These programs required co-payment, and
prioritized younger children. After-school programs were subject to similar requirements as regular child
care providers.
19The preschool teacher education is a college degree, and the head teacher was responsible for planning,
observation, collaboration and evaluation of the work, under the requirements specified in the strict
regulations for subsidized child care. Teachers typically worked closely with one or two assistants, and
were responsible for the educational programs in separate groups of 6–18 children and for day-to-day
interaction with parents. There were no educational requirements for assistants.
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prior to the reform. Of course, not all families wanted to enroll their child in kindergarten.
In a survey from 1992, about 70 % of parents said that they had enrolled their six year
old in a kindergarten program. 20 % reported that the child was cared for by a parent,
and 3 % reported close relatives as the main care taker during the day. 5 % were cared
for by an unlicensed care taker or by a nanny (Norwegian Ministry of Child and Family
Aﬀairs, 1996). As also suggested in Panel (a) of Figure 2 below, rationing of kindergarten
does not seem to have been a factor at the time the reform was implemented.
Other reforms. We may worry that there were other reforms that could also have aﬀected
our cohorts diﬀerently. However, the closest reform in primary education prior to the 1997-
reform was implemented in 1986, while there was no additional reforms until the start of
the school year 2007–2008. This ensures that the 1990 and 1991 cohorts completed their
entire compulsory schooling with the national curriculum introduced in 1997. Also, a
nationwide cash-for-care reform was implemented in 1998, and expanded in 1999, paying
families with children below two years old (from 1998) and three years old (from 1999)
that did not utilize subsidized child care a substantial monthly cash allowance.20 While
this reform did not aﬀect the children in our sample directly, it could have had an eﬀect on
younger siblings and therefore an indirect eﬀect on the children in our sample.21However,
it seems unlikely that the impact of the reform diﬀer much between children born in 1990
and 1991, which constitute our baseline estimation sample.22
3.2 Empirical strategy
To estimate the relationship between kindergarten and children’s long-term outcomes,
we exploit the temporal and spatial variation in pre-reform kindergarten enrollment in a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences setup. Ideally, we want to compare the child outcomes before and
after the implementation of the mandatory kindergarten reform of children who would
enroll in voluntary kindergarten at age six (i.e. the control group) and children who
would not enroll in voluntary kindergarten at age six (i.e. the treatment group). Our
basic diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) model estimated by OLS, can then be expressed as
Yit = αt + γ1Treatedi + λTreatedi × Postt +X ￿itβ + ￿it (1)
20See Schøne (2004)or Drange and Rege (2012) for a detailed description of the cash-for-care reform.
21Bettinger, Rege, and Haegeland (2011) find that school performance improves among children with
siblings eligible for the Cash-for-Care subsidy.
22To investigate this directly, we have estimated a baseline DD model in equation (1) using as dependent
variable a dummy equal to one if the child has a younger sibling born 1996 or later (i.e. partly or
fully eligible for the subsidy) and zero otherwise. The estimate is almost exactly zero (0.004) and not
statistically significant at conventional levels. This suggests that the cash-for-care reform does not pose
a threat to our empirical strategy.
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where i indexes child, t indexes cohort, Postt is a dummy equal to one if the child is
aﬀected by the reform (i.e. t ≥ 1991) and zero otherwise, and Treatedi is a dummy
equal to one if the child is in the treatment group. Note that the cohort-specific constant
term consumes the separate eﬀect of the Post-dummy. We estimate the model with and
without a large set of control variables for child and parental characteristics Xit, including
the child’s sex, the mother’s and her spouse’s age, years of education, and family size (see
also Section 4). We also include municipality fixed-eﬀects to capture potentially diﬀering
labor market environments. All control variables are measured prior to the impact of the
reform and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
In practice, whether a child would enroll in voluntary kindergarten cannot be observed
for post-reform cohorts, since all children are enrolled at age six. To estimate equation
(1), we therefore use enrollment in kindergarten at age five to determine treatment. This
should be a good proxy since most children who are enrolled in kindergarten at age five
are also enrolled at age six. That is, children who are enrolled in child care the year they
turn five are placed in the control group, while children who are not enrolled in child care
at age five are placed in the treatment group.
Panel (a) of Figure 2 displays the trend in kindergarten enrollment at age five and six
in our estimation sample. We note the close relationship between the two series over time
in the pre-reform period, where the two lines are virtually parallel. This suggests that
enrollment at age five captures the counterfactual evolution of enrollment at age six well.
Furthermore, we note that there is no spike in the enrollment of five year olds following
the reform, when children age six are no longer taking up places in child care centers.
This suggests that there was no discernible rationing of kindergarten for these age groups
in our period of study. Finally, we note that kindergarten enrollment in pre-reform years
is around 85 %, giving a treatment group of about 15 % of the total sample.
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(a) Kindergarten enrollment (b) Exam performance
(c) High school dropout (d) Academic track
Figure 2: Kindergarten enrollment and children’s schooling outcomes by treatment for
cohorts born 1988–1992.
Notes: Vertical axes are scaled to approximately one standard deviation. High school dropout is not yet available for the
1992-cohort. Variables are defined in Section 4
The validity of our DD strategy hinges on the assumption that the trend in school
performance among children in the treatment group would have been the same as for
children in the control group, in the absence of the reform. As emphasized by Besley and
Case (2000), this essentially assumes common time eﬀects and no compositional changes
between the treatment and control group. The richness of our registry data allows us
to condition on a large set of observable characteristics, to investigate changes in the
composition of the groups.
To investigate the time eﬀects, Panels (b)–(d) of Figure 2 display mean outcomes of
cohorts born 1988–1992 separate for the treatment and control group, and the diﬀerence
between the two groups over time (on the right axis). The vertical axes are scaled to
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about one standard deviation in all the figures. The trends are quite flat and strikingly
similar across the treatment and control group throughout the period. The similarity of
the trend in the pre-reform period, supports the assumption of common time eﬀects. That
there is no jump in the treatment group from the 1991-cohort onwards, nor a divergence
in the trends in the post-reform period, is first evidence that the reform had little impact
on children’s school performance.
Though the documentation suggests little change in the contents, we could also worry
that the new kindergarten program integrated in schools in fact was diﬀerent from the
former program, and thus could have had an eﬀect also on children in the comparison
group. We pay close attention to this in our robustness analysis provided in Section 6,
finding no support for an eﬀect on the comparison group. To further challenge the validity
of our empirical specification, Section 6 also reports results from a series of specification
checks, including a placebo reform and treatment-specific trends.
The diﬀerence in enrollment between five and six year olds should not be a threat
to the internal validity of our estimates. Higher enrollment at age six than at age five
may, however, dilute the estimated treatment eﬀect by misplacing some children in the
treatment group who enroll in kindergarten only at age six. Our estimates may therefore
be interpreted similar to intention-to-treat estimates, and should be scaled in order to
arrive at the average treatment eﬀect on the treated. In 1990, 48 % of children who are
not enrolled at age five are enrolled at age six, suggesting that only 52 % of the treatment
group are in fact aﬀected by the reform. In interpreting our results, we should bear this
in mind, scaling the estimated eﬀects by a factor of 1/.52 = 1.9 to arrive at the average
eﬀect on the treated.23
4 Data
Dataset and variables. Our data are based on administrative registers from Statistics Nor-
way. Specifically, we use a rich longitudinal database which covers every resident from
1992 to 2007. It contains individual demographic information (e.g. sex, age, immigrant
status, marital status, number of children), socioeconomic data (e.g. years of education,
income, employment status), and geographic identifiers for municipality of residence. In-
formation on school performance, educational attainment and school enrollment for every
individual is based on annual reports from Norwegian educational establishments. Income
and employment data are collected from tax records and other administrative registers.
The household information is from the Central Population Register, which is updated
annually by the local population registries and verified by the Norwegian Tax Authority.
We also have access to registry data on municipal child care coverage reported by the
23The opposite misclassification is almost completely absent: More than 97 % of children who are
enrolled in kindergarten at age 5 are also enrolled at age 6.
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child care institutions themselves. The reliability of Norwegian register data is considered
to be very good, as is documented by the fact that they received the highest rating in a
data quality assessment prepared for the OECD by Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding
(1995).
Measuring kindergarten enrollment. There is, unfortunately, no register of individual
kindergarten or child care enrollment. However, parents may claim the cost of child
care as a deduction on their earned income. To identify whether a child is enrolled
in kindergarten, we therefore use a binary variable equal to one if the child’s parents
claimed a tax deduction for child care at child age five. Of course, if a child has siblings,
we cannot verify which of the children the deduction is claimed for (if not all). To get
around this issue, we assume that child care enrollment is monotonous in age, such that
older children are in child care whenever younger children are in child care. This ensures
that at least the older child in child care age is enrolled whenever the parents claim the
deduction. Finally, because we want to identify enrollment at age five, we exclude from
our sample children that have a sibling born one year previous. To verify that our measure
of kindergarten enrollment is sound, we have calculated the municipal enrollment rates
implied by this measure.24 We then compare these rates to the actual enrollment rates
from administrative registers, reported by the child care institutions themselves. The
correlation between the two is near perfect at about 0.94.
Estimation sample. We start with the universe of children born 1990–1991, who reside in
Norway the year they turn five years old and who graduate from lower secondary school
in 2005–2006. We then restrict our sample to children born to native-born parents, con-
stituting about 96% of the population, in order both to focus our study on the eﬀect
of mandating, and to sidestep problems of comparability between native and immigrant
children. We also exclude children with missing values on our dependent variable. Rather
than exclude children with missing values on control variables, we construct dummy vari-
ables for missing and include these in our regressions. As mentioned, we also exclude
children with a one year older sibling in order to more cleanly identify kindergarten en-
rollment from tax records.25 Our main sample then consists of 111,397 individuals, of
which just over 16 % are in the treatment group. In our extended sample, we consider
the analogous population of children born 1988–1992.
Measuring school performance. Our main outcome is an average of grades on nationally
24While the vast majority of deductions claimed are for child care costs, some other costs may also
be claimed under the same statute, e.g. outlays for support for disabled children or registered nannys
(“dagmamma”). In 1992, 5 percent of parents reported in a survey to have their six year-old in informal
care with a nanny or child minder (Norwegian Ministry of Child and Family Aﬀairs, 1996). About 1/5
of these reported to have a registered nanny (Ellingsæter and Gulbrandsen, 2003), and only these could
deduct expences from their taxes. This implies that about 1 % of the sample may be wrongfully registered
as being in child care when they were in fact cared for by a nanny.
25Results are unchanged if we include these children.
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administered end-of-school exams. At graduation from compulsory school, children are
tested on two or three exams in randomly drawn theoretical subjects—one or two written
exams and one oral exam. The written exam is uniform across the country and provided
by the Central Education Authority, and is corrected by external evaluators. The oral
exam is also evaluated by an external examiner, and takes place at the school at which the
child is enrolled, usually with a local teacher present. Grades are awarded on a scale from
one to six, where six indicates excellence and one indicates very little competence. Grade
retention is illegal, hence all children are allowed to graduate regardless of their grades.
In addition, teachers assign each child grades in 12–13 subjects, based on performance
throughout the year. There are nine theoretical subjects and four practical subjects.26
Measuring high school drop out. In our data we can observe whether an individual is
enrolled in education and how many years they have successfully completed. We define
high school drop out as either not being enrolled in education, or not being on year for
age in graduating year. That is, we code high school dropout as not being registered in
your 13th year of education in the fall of the year you turn 18.27 Note that this definition
is somewhat strict, since it requires that children are not delayed.
Measuring academic track: In Norway, children are first tracked when they start upper
secondary school. There are two main tracks (which are divided into 13 more specialized
sub-disciplines): The academic track which is required for entry into university and college
studies, and the vocational track which qualifies for a practical occupation. To consider
whether the reform had an impact on academic tracking, we use a dummy equal to one if
the child started on the academic track in the year following graduation from compulsory
schooling. Note that enrollment in upper secondary school is almost complete in these
cohorts, with about 94 % of children enrolling in one of the two tracks. We have also
estimated the eﬀect on the decision to enroll, finding no impact of the reform. If a child
does not enroll in upper secondary school the year following graduation, he or she is
excluded from these estimations.
Measuring maternal labor supply: We include three measures of maternal labor supply in
our analysis. First, we measure earnings in 2011-USD. Second we construct two dummies,
one variable capturing whether the mother is employed at all, and one variable capturing
if the mother work full time. In our dataset we can observe whether an individual works
4–19 hours, 20–29 hours or more than 30 hours per week. We define a mothers as being
employed if she is registered in one of these three categories in the outcome year. Because
26Theoretical subjects are written and oral Norwegian, written and oral English, mathematics, nature
and science, social science, and religion. Practical subjects are home economics, physical education,
music, and arts and crafts.
27Final graduation from high school should occur the year they turn 19 in the academic track and the
year they turn 20 in the vocational track. This information is not yet available in the data.
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of lags in the submission of employee information by firms, some individuals are recorded
as being in full-time employment despite the records also indicating very low or even zero
earnings. We correct this by defining mothers as full time employed if they work more
than 30 hours per week and earn more than two times the basic amount in the Norwegian
pension system.28
Covariates. To account for possible observable changes in composition between years,
we include a number of child and parent characteristics in our analysis, measured when
the child is five years old. Child characteristics include municipality of residence, gender,
number of siblings, and finally a dummy measuring if the child lived in a densely populated
area. Background characteristics include a dummy measuring if the mother/father worked
full time, a dummy for whether the mother/father completed high school and a dummy
indicating if the mother/father finished a college education. In addition, we include a
dummy capturing missing observations on mothers/fathers education. Further, we include
a dummy that captures whether the mother/father was younger than 22 when the child
was born. We also include a dummy for having missing observations on either the mother
or the father. If both parents are missing we exclude the observation. Finally, we include
a dummy capturing if one or both parents received welfare benefits, a dummy measuring
if the family was low income (defined as earnings below the 10th decile in the family
income distribution in the cohort born in 1990), and a dummy capturing if the child lives
with only one of its parents.
Descriptive statistics. Means of the outcome variables were presented in Figure 2. In
table 2, we present characteristics for the entire sample in the first two columns, and
diﬀerences between the two groups by year in the remaining columns. We see no evidence
of changes over time for characteristics of children or their parents between the treated
and the comparison group. As discussed above, it is clear, however, that the treated
children to a greater extent come from families with younger and less educated parents,
and are more likely to belong to a family on welfare and/or to a single parent family.
They are also overrepresented in the low income family group. This suggests that the
children in our treatment group have a more disadvantaged background, in line with both
what was expected when the reform thought to promote social mobility was introduced
(Norwegian Ministry of Education, 1992-93)as well as to what has been found in related
early intervention literature(Barnett and Belfield, 2006).
28
The basic amount of the Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme are used to define labor market status, and determine
eligibility for unemployment benefits as well as disability and old age pension. In 2011, one basic amount was about USD
13,000.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Mean (SD) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Treat (T) Comp. (C) T − C T − C T − C T − C T − C
A. Child and family characteristics
Female 0.49 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
1 sibling 0.40 (0.49) 0.51 (0.50) -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12
2 siblings 0.28 (0.45) 0.24 (0.43) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.02
3 siblings + 0.12 (0.32) 0.06 (0.23) 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
Big school 0.57 (0.49) 0.58 (0.49) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
On welfare 0.19 (0.40) 0.08 (0.26) 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.16
Low income 0.08 (0.27) 0.00 (0.05) 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09
Single parent 0.29 (0.46) 0.17 (0.38) 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.14
B. Mother characteristics
Employed 0.18 (0.38) 0.70 (0.46) -0.55 -0.54 -0.52 -0.53 -0.64
– full time 0.07 (0.26) 0.33 (0.47) -0.26 -0.27 -0.26 -0.28 -0.32
High sch. 0.34 (0.47) 0.54 (0.50) -0.21 -0.22 -0.20 -0.22 -0.26
College 0.13 (0.34) 0.28 (0.45) -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.20
Teenage mother 0.21 (0.41) 0.13 (0.33) 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.11
C. Father characteristics
Employed 0.63 (0.48) 0.73 (0.44) -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11
High sch. 0.49 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49) -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.12
College 0.18 (0.39) 0.27 (0.44) -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10
Teenage father 0.07 (0.26) 0.05 (0.21) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05
Notes: The treatment group include the children whose parents do not report tax deduction for child care expenses the
year the child turns five. Outcome and control variables are defined in Section 4. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
5 Empirical results
In this section, we first report estimated mean eﬀects of mandating kindergarten on chil-
dren’s long-term schooling. All specifications are estimated with municipality fixed eﬀects
to account for time-invariant diﬀerences between municipalities. To address concerns
about compositional changes we have estimated the baseline model with and without the
set of covariates capturing important child and parent characteristics. We then investigate
potential heterogeneity in the eﬀects, reporting first estimated eﬀects on school perfor-
mance across the grading distribution, and then estimated eﬀects in subsamples defined
from child and family characteristics from our baseline model including covariates.
Mean eﬀect. Table 3 reports our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates based on equation (1)
from the sample of children born 1990–1991. In Panel A, we report the estimated eﬀects on
exam performance at the end of compulsory school, with and without the set of covariates.
The estimates indicate that the reform had little eﬀect on children’s school performance,
with a precisely estimated point estimate of about 1 % of a standard deviation. Excluding
covariates in the second row of Panel A hardly moves the estimate. This indicates that
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Table 3: Mean eﬀects on school performance, high school dropout rates and academic
track in upper secondary school.
Cohort-diﬀerence DD
Coeﬀ SE Coeﬀ SE Mean [SD]
A. School performance
Baseline -0.01 (0.014) 0 [1]
No covariates -0.013 (0.016)
B. High school dropout
Baseline 0.013 (0.008) 0.33 [0.47]
No covariates 0.014 (0.008)
C. Academic track
Baseline -0.008 (0.007) 0.40 [0.49]
No covariates -0.009 (0.008)
Notes: N = 111, 397 (N = 107, 707 for academic track). UPDATE??? Estimations are based on OLS on equation (1).
The controls are listed in table 2 and the dependent variables are defined in section 4 and 5. In Panel A, coeﬃcients are
standardized to the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Scaled refers to the estimate scaled by the take-up, see
Section 3. Mean refers to pre-reform mean in the treatment group. Standard errors (SE) are robust for heteroskedasticity
and all models include municipality fixed eﬀects.
there are no important compositional changes between the two cohorts, as expected from
historical reports and descriptive statistics. Given the precision of the estimate and scaling
for take-up, we can rule out eﬀects above 3.3% and below -7.1 % of a standard deviation
at a confidence level of 5 %.
While studies of how early interventions aﬀect child cognitive outcomes often find
positive eﬀects in the short run, these eﬀects are usually found to dissipate over time (see
e.g. Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, and Shonkoﬀ (2006)). At the same time, persistent
eﬀects are often found on outcomes that may also reflect non-cognitive traits.29
In Panels B and C, we consider eﬀects on high school dropout rates and enrollment
in the academic track in upper secondary school, where earlier studies have often found
an improvement from early intervention programs. However, again we find little evidence
of any substantial eﬀect, whether or not we include covariates. Indeed, if anything, we
find a small negative impact on children’s schooling of mandating kindergarten, with a
slight rise in high school dropout rates of 1.3 percentage points (from a pre-reform mean
of about 33 % in the treatment group).
Heterogeneous eﬀects. Though we find little support for an eﬀect of mandating kinder-
garten on mean school performance, high school drop out or choice of academic track, we
have already emphasized the general expectation of heterogeneous eﬀects of early child-
hood interventions. A worry may therefore be that estimated mean eﬀects mask large,
and potentially countervailing, eﬀects among diﬀerent groups of children. On the one
29Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, and Shonkoﬀ (2006) report that the early randomized interventions
from the US (Perry Preschool and the Abecedarian Project) lowered the likelihood of grade repetition
and increased the likelihood of finishing high school for treated children.
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Table 4: Distributional eﬀects on school performance
Coeﬀ SE Perc. value
5th percentile 0.001 (0.005) 2.0
10th percentile -0.002 (0.006) 2.5
25th percentile -0.011 (0.006) 3.0
50th percentile -0.002 (0.006) 4.0
75th percentile -0.005 (0.005) 4.5
90th percentile -0.005 (0.003) 5.0
95th percentile -0.002 (0.002) 5.5
Notes: N = 111, 397. Estimations are based on OLS on equation (1). The controls are listed in table 2 and the dependent
variables are defined in section 4 and 5. Percentile values refer to pre-reform percentiles in the treatment group. Standard
errors (SE) are robust for heteroskedasticity and all models include municipality fixed eﬀects.
hand, we may believe that the reform would be particularly beneficial in the lower parts
of the grading distribution. On the other hand, we may believe that the reform may have
quite diﬀerent eﬀects depending on characteristics of the child, the family or the local
school. For instance, the overview provided by Almond and Currie (2011) suggests that
girls and children with low educated parents benefit more than other children.
To address the first concern, we have estimated the impact of the reform on school
performance at every point in the grading distribution. Specifically, we estimate equa-
tion (1) over the sample of children born 1990–1991, where the outcome variable is a
dummy equal to one if the child’s school performance at end of compulsory school is
above the given percentile, and zero otherwise. Estimates should then be interpreted as
the percentage point change following the reform in the probability of performing above a
given percentile for a child in the treatment group compared to a child in the comparison
group.30
In Table 4, we report estimated eﬀects at a set of percentiles of the grading distribution
covering the bottom, the middle and the top of the distribution.31 Results show that
there is essentially no heterogeneity across the grading distribution in how mandatory
kindergarten aﬀects children’s exam performance at end of lower secondary school. The
estimates are almost uniformly negative, but small and precisely estimated. They are also
not statistically significant at conventional levels, except for the small negative eﬀect on
the probability of performing above the 25th percentile.
To address the second concern, we have estimated separate reform eﬀects for all out-
comes in subsamples defined from a number of background characteristics. The estimates
are reported in Table 5. To facilitate comparison of estimates across subsamples, we also
report the mean outcome in the subsample among treated children from the pre-reform
cohort. We also report the share of treated children and the take-up rate in the subsample
30This procedure is essentially the first step in the RIF-procedure proposed by Firpo, Fortin, and
Lemieux (2009) and applied to the DID-framework by Havnes and Mogstad (2010).
31We have estimated eﬀects at all percentiles, which yields the same picture.
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Figure 3: Estimated reform eﬀect and take-up across subsamples
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Note: The horizontal line and the shaded area correspond to the baseline estimate and its 95% confidence interval. Circles
mark the estimates and take-up rates for subgroups reported in Table 5. The size of the circle indicates the size of the
subgroup among treated children born in 1990. Take-up is defined as the probability that a child born in 1990 was not
enrolled in child care at age five but was enrolled in kindergarten at age six, see Section 3.2. Coeﬃcients and take-up rates
for subgroups are reported in Table 5.
in the final two columns.32
The results give little indication of important heterogeneity in the impact of manda-
tory kindergarten, which is estimated to be very small, and almost uniformly negative.
However, lower sample size implies less precision, and some patterns in the point estimates
may warrant comment. First, girls seem to benefit more than boys, in line with what is
often found in the literature on cognitive impact of early childhood interventions (An-
derson, 2008). Second, though very imprecise, we also note a pattern that children that
initially perform well, as measured by mean exam grade pre-reform, may tend to receive
the most harm from mandatory kindergarten. In particular, children of higher educated
families on average experience a quite substantial negative eﬀect of the reform. Though
estimates are too imprecise to provide much confidence, this could be interpreted as an
indication that parents with high levels of human capital provide a good alternative to
preschool, in line with Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) and estimates in Havnes
and Mogstad (2010).
32As discussed in Section 3, take-up is defined as the probability that a child who does not enroll in
child care at age five, and is therefore in our treatment group, would enroll in kindergarten at age six,
and should therefore not be aﬀected by the reform.
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6 Specification checks
To improve our confidence in the estimates, and to explore alternative channels by which
an eﬀect may work, this section aims to challenge our empirical approach in diﬀerent
ways. First, we confront the key identifying assumption of our empirical strategy, namely
the common trend assumption. Second, we consider whether there may be a separate
eﬀect of the reform on our comparison group that may attenuate eﬀects on our treatment
group. Third, we investigate whether there might be a delayed eﬀect of the reform on
later cohorts. Fourth, we consider some alternative and less aggregated school outcomes
to understand whether there may be eﬀects on some particular sets of skills that are
washed out in our aggregated measure. Finally, we investigate whether the reform may
have had an eﬀect on the labor supply of mothers, estimating eﬀects on both the extensive
and the intensive margin. For brevity, we focus on school performance in reporting of the
specification checks. Results are similar for high school dropout and enrollment in the
academic track, for which results are reported in Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix.
Common trend assumption. The primary threat in DD estimation is that the change in
the observed outcome in the comparison group in the absence of the reform diﬀers from
the change in the potential outcome of the treatment group in the absence of the reform.
To investigate this, we start by considering a placebo reform, pretending that the reform
was implemented in the pre-reform period. The first row of Panel A in Table 6 reports
the estimate from equation (1) estimated over the sample of children born 1989–1990,
where Postt is redefined to be equal to one for children born in 1990 and zero otherwise.
A significant estimate in this specification would put in doubt our identifying assumption.
However, the estimate is almost precisely zero and nowhere near statistical significance.
Allowing treatment and comparison groups to follow separate trends is another way
to challenge the common trend assumption. By extrapolating pre-reform trends into the
post-reform period, we essentially restrict our estimates to reflect how outcomes deviate
from the pre-reform trajectory. As emphasized by Besley and Case (2000), this is a
simple yet potentially powerful test, which can often kill otherwise large and significant
DD estimates.
To allow estimation of a trend, we extend the estimation sample to the start of our
data series in 1988, and include the 1992-cohort, which is the last cohort that we can
confidently use due to the cash-for-care reform in 1998. We then set Postt = 1 for t = 1991
and t = 1992, and zero otherwise. For a correct comparison, results on this sample using
our main regression equation (1) are reported in the first row of Panel B. Estimates
conform to those in the baseline. In row 2 of panel B, we include a linear treatment-
specific trend, while row 3 includes a second-order polynomial treatment-specific trend.
Both specifications confirm the baseline estimates of essentially no eﬀect of introducing
mandatory kindergarten.
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Table 6: Robustness – Exam grade
Sample Post Coeﬀ SE N
A. Key specification check
Placebo 1989–1990 1990 0.005 (0.016) 110,171
B. Treatment-specific trends
Extending pre-reform 1988–1992 1991–92 -0.004 (0.010) 267,745
Linear trend 1988–1992 1991–92 -0.016 (0.017) 267,745
Quadratic trend 1988–1992 1991–92 -0.013 (0.022) 267,745
C. Flexible trends
Trend × covar 1988–1992 1991–92 0.018 (0.009) 267,745
Year FE × covar 1988–1992 1991–92 0.011 (0.009) 267,745
D. Other
1st diﬀ.: Treatment 1990–1991 1991 -0.007 (0.013) 18,108
1st diﬀ.: Comparison 1990–1991 1991 0.004 (0.008) 93,288
Delayed eﬀect 1988–1992 1991 -0.005 (0.011) 267,745
1992 -0.004 (0.014)
Notes: Column 2 gives the estimation sample. In all estimations, Postt = 1 for t is given in Column 3. In Panel A
estimation is based on OLS on equation (1). In Panel B, estimations are based on equation (1), including a linear (row
2) and a quadratic (row 3) treatment-specific trend. In Panel C, estimations are based on equation (1), including a linear
trend (row 1) or cohort dummies (row 2) interacted with a set of baseline covariates (school size; mother’s and father’s
education level; municipal income; urban area). In rows 1 and 2 of Panel D, estimations are based on equation (2), while
row 3 is based on equation (3). The controls are listed in table 2 and the dependent variables are defined in section 4.
Standard errors (SE) are robust for heteroskedasticity and all models include municipality fixed eﬀects.
As an alternative, we can instead follow Duflo (2001) in allowing children to follow
diﬀerent trends depending on underlying characteristics. Specifically, we first estimate
equation (1) including a linear trend interacted with baseline covariates.33 We then relax
the assumption of a linear trend, interacting instead the baseline covariates with the cohort
fixed eﬀects. Results are reported in Panel C, again confirming our baseline estimate of
hardly any impact of the mandatory kindergarten reform on children’s school performance
at end of compulsory schooling.
Eﬀect on comparison group. We could also worry that the new kindergarten program
integrated in schools in fact was diﬀerent from the former program, and thus could have
had an eﬀect also on children in the comparison group. If the kindergarten program
oﬀered prior to the reform was of lower quality than the program oﬀered after the reform,
then the comparison group would experience a positive impact of the reform. In this case,
the new mandatory kindergarten program may in fact have a positive eﬀect for children
33The baseline covariates are measured the year the child turns 5 years old, and include an overall
measure of school size, the education level of the mother and father, the average income in the municipality
of residence, and a dummy indicating whether the child lives in an urban area.
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in the treatment group, that is simply netted out in our DD-setup against a positive eﬀect
in the treatment group (of similar size). Similarly, a negative impact on the comparison
group could mask a negative impact in the comparison group.
To investigate this, we consider the two groups of children separately, to reveal whether
there are in fact substantial changes in the grades of children around the implementation of
the reform. Looking back at Panel (b) of Figure 2, we see no indication of such changes in
neither the treatment nor the comparison group. More formally, and including covariates,
we estimate first diﬀerence regressions separately for the two groups based on
Yit = α + λPostt +X
￿
itβ + ￿it (2)
Results are reported in rows 1–2 of Panel D, and give no reason to believe that mandating
kindergarten had much impact on the comparison group, nor the treatment group.34
Delayed eﬀect. A further worry may be that a positive eﬀect of the mandatory kinder-
garten reform was oﬀset, completely or in part, by adjustment problems in the year of
implementation. Unfortunately, the cash-for-care reform implemented in late 1998 (see
Schøne (2004) or Drange and Rege (2012)), creates problems for identifying eﬀects on
cohorts born 1993 and onwards. We can however plausibly estimate eﬀects on children
born in 1992. To ensure that the comparison group is not smaller than the treatment
group, and to provide better identification of control variables, we also use the extended
pre-reform period used above. We then extend the post-reform period to include in the
estimation also children born in 1992. To allow for diﬀerent treatment eﬀects on children
born in the two years, we expand on equation (1) to include a separate interaction term
for the 1992-cohort. Specifically, we estimate the following regression using OLS on the
sample of children born 1988–1992,
Yit = αt + γ1Treatedi + λ91Treatedi × 1 (t = 1991) (3)
+λ92Treatedi × 1 (t = 1992) +X ￿itβ + ￿it
where 1 (t = s) is an indicator function equal to one if t = s and zero otherwise. Results
are reported in the final row of Panel D, again revealing no evidence that the reform had
an important impact on children’s school performance at end of compulsory schooling.
Alternative outcomes. We may also worry that the dependent variable is not picking up
the relevant margin of the eﬀect. For instance, if kindergarten aﬀects mostly oral skills or
mostly skills that are relevant in one or a few particular subjects, then our estimate may
be small simply because it is diluted by including subjects in our outcome that test skills
that are not aﬀected. To investigate this, we consider alternative outcomes that should
34Note that grading is performed by external sensors who typically grade exams from several schools.
Grading on a curve should therefore not be of much concern with these grades, at least in the short run.
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reflect diﬀerent sets of skills.
We start by separating the written and oral exams that make up our main dependent
variable. Since there are usually two written for each oral exam, any eﬀect on the oral
exam may be diluted by a zero or counteracting eﬀect on the written exam. In Panel A
of Table 7, we report results from our baseline regression where the dependent variable
is replaced by first the average of written exam grades and then by the grade on the oral
exam. Estimated eﬀects are virtually identical.
In addition to the externally graded written and oral exams used in our main analysis,
we also have access to children’s teacher-assigned grades at end of compulsory school in
all subjects (see Section 4). We can then run our main specification (1) on a number
of measures based on the grades the children earn when they graduate. Estimates are
reported in Panel B of Table 7.
We start by estimating the eﬀect on the overall grade point average (GPA; the mean
grade across all subjects), which is reported in the first row of Panel B. Not surprisingly,
the estimated eﬀect on the overall GPA is virtually identical to the eﬀect on the average
exam grade used in our main analysis. We then separate out the subjects that are tested
on the written and oral exams used in our main analysis, and those that are not tested
on these exams.35 Estimates from our baseline specification using these as dependent
variables, are virtually identical to the baseline. Finally, we group subjects according
to the types of skills expected to determine the performance. Specifically, we group
subjects into the following categories: “Sciences” (Mathematics, Natural science, and
Social science), “Languages” (written and oral Norwegian, and written and oral English),
and “Culture” (Religion, Music, Home Economics and Arts and crafts). Estimates are
reported in rows 4–6 in Panel B of Table 7, and are again virtually identical. We conclude,
therefore, that there is no evidence of substantial eﬀects that were not picked up in our
main analysis.
Maternal labor supply. An alternative eﬀect of the mandatory kindergarten reform is
an increase in maternal labor supply and family income. This is important in itself
because any expansions in the tax base may oﬀset the financial costs of subsidizing child
care, particularly because the dominant pre-reform mode of care was parental care. At
the same time, higher maternal labor supply would also aﬀect family income, and could
indirectly aﬀect child performance (Dahl and Lochner, forthcoming; Løken, Mogstad, and
Wiswall, 2010).36
35Subjects tested are written and oral Norwegian, written and oral English, mathematics, nature and
science, social science and religion. Subjects not tested are home economics, physical education, music,
and arts and crafts.
36In a survey of the early literature, Blau and Currie (2006) report elasticities of maternal employment
with respect to the price of child care ranging from 0 to -1. More recently, using more plausible identifi-
cation, Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) find a positive eﬀect on maternal labor supply following the
introduction of heavily subsidized universally available child care in Quebec . Meanwhile, Lundin, Mork,
and Ockert (2008) find no such eﬀect when studying a childcare reform which capped childcare prices in
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Table 7: Alternative outcomes
Coeﬀ SE N Dep mean
A. Separating written and oral exams
Exam, written subjects -0.011 (0.015) 108,473 3.21
Exam, oral subjects -0.012 (0.015) 105,224 4.05
B. Teacher-assigned grades
Grade point average -0.013 (0.014) 111,185 3.79
Exam subjects -0.013 (0.014) 111,021 3.64
Non-exam subjects -0.007 (0.015 ) 111,038 4.12
Sciences -0.011 (0.014) 111,225 3.57
Languages -0.015 (0.015 ) 110,951 3.66
Culture -0.008 (0.014) 111,157 4.11
C. Mothers labor supply, child age 7
Earnings (2011-USD) 1,540 (914) 46,742 20,110
Employment -0.002 (0.010) 46,742 0.23
Full time -0.000 (0.008) 46,742 0.10
Notes: In Panel A and B estimations are based on OLS on equation (1) including covariates. The controls are listed in table
2 and the dependent variables are defined in section 4. “Sciences” includes Mathematics, Natural science, and Social science;
“Languages” includes written and oral Norwegian, and written and oral English; “Culture” includes Religion, Music, Home
Economics and Arts and crafts. In Panel C estimations are based on OLS on equation (1), and the sample is restricted
to mothers with youngest child of relevant age. Covariates included are listed in table 2, excluding measures of mothers
employment and including municipality-specific unemployment rates. The dependent variables are defined in section 4.
Standard errors (SE) are robust for heteroskedasticity and all models include municipality fixed eﬀects.
In line with related literature (Gelbach, 2002; Havnes and Mogstad, 2011a), we restrict
our analysis to mothers with their youngest child born in 1990 or 1991. This is where
we would expect the strongest labor supply responses. As our outcome of interest, we
consider labor supply of mothers when the child turns seven years old. That is, ideally
we consider the labor supply of mothers whose youngest child was enrolled or was not
enrolled in kindergarten in the months January through late August.37
To estimate the eﬀects on maternal labor supply, we apply an analogous empirical
strategy to the one in our main analysis. Specifically, we estimate the DD-model in
equation (1) where t refers to the cohort of the youngest child,Treat is equal to one for
mothers of children who enroll in child care at age five, while Post is equal to one if
the youngest child is born in 1991. We also include the same covariates we use when
measuring children’s outcomes.
Results are reported in Panel C of Table 7. We first estimate the impact of the reform
Sweden. See also Schlosser (2005); ?); Cascio (2009); Havnes and Mogstad (2011b) and Berlinski and
Galiani (2007). For a review of the literature, see Blau and Currie (2006).
37We have also estimated eﬀects when the child is six (when the child may be enrolled September
through December), finding no impact of the reform.
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on annual earnings, normalized to 2011-USD. The results show a modest impact on annual
earnings (p = 0.092). To explore whether mandating kindergarten had an eﬀect on the
extensive or the intensive margin of maternal labor supply, we next estimate the impact
on the probability of being employed (row 2) or being in full time employment (row 3)
finding no impact on either margin. Thus, in spite of a marginally significant increase in
earnings, we find little to suggest that the reform improved labor market attachment of
mothers in our sample.
7 Concluding remarks
Evidence on the impact of child care interventions has been dominated by estimates from
targeted programs. These may be hard to apply to the general population. Recent re-
search provides some insight into the eﬀects of large-scale programs. However, knowledge
on the impact of the universal programs advocated in many western countries is still
scarce (Baker, 2011). This is particularly worrisome given the heterogeneity created by
wide diﬀerences in individual alternatives to subsidized care. The high returns found
for children from disadvantaged families, coupled with much lower participation rates in
existing programs compared to children from more advantaged backgrounds, suggests a
potentially strong social gradient in expanding or mandating early childhood interventions
(Barnett and Belfield, 2006). Indeed, in an eﬀort to counter diﬀerences at school entry
depending on social background, many countries are currently moving towards subsidized
kindergarten or child care available for the general population.
In the current paper, we provide first evidence on the eﬀect of mandating kindergarten
at age 5–6 on children’s schooling outcomes. Specifically, we consider the impact on school
performance at the end of compulsory schooling at age 15–16, on high school dropout and
on the likelihood of enrolling in an academic track. Our identifying variation comes from
a 1997-reform in Norway that lowered school starting-age from seven to six. The goal of
the reform was to counter diﬀerences in learning outcomes between children from diﬀerent
socioeconomic backgrounds. Our results suggest that extending the reach of kindergarten
in the general population by making it compulsory, does little to counter diﬀerences
in schooling outcomes between children from diﬀerent socioeconomic backgrounds when
access to child care is substantial. In our baseline estimation, the precisely estimated eﬀect
on the child’s exam performance is below 2 % of a standard deviation, with negligible
impacts also on high school dropout and academic tracking. Estimates are similarly
small when we consider eﬀects across the grading distribution and in diﬀerent subsamples
defined from characteristics of the child or parents. A number of specification checks lend
support to our empirical strategy.
It is also noteworthy that estimated eﬀects are similarly negligible when we consider
some alternative and less aggregated school outcomes that could reveal eﬀects on some
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particular sets of skills that are washed out in an aggregated measure. We further find
little evidence for an impact on maternal labor supply.
Three alternative explanations for the weak eﬀect of mandating kindergarten stand
out. On the one hand, the results may suggest that parents sort relatively eﬃciently into
the existing kindergarten programs, so that children that are not in such programs in
fact may opt out partly because they will benefit little. Second, the results may suggest
that the children aﬀected by the program are too old to benefit, and that universal
programs must start at earlier ages. In both cases, our results would imply that to
universalize kindergarten at age 5–6 is a misguided strategy for improving outcomes of
disadvantaged children. However, the weak eﬀect could also suggest that it was the
particular program that failed to generate benefits in this age group. This could imply
that the focus on learning through play, emphasized in the implemented program, is not
successful in generating learning gains in this group of children.
Finally, the conclusion that mandating kindergarten had little impact on children’s
school performance may cut both ways: While the large benefits expected by proponents
can be firmly rejected, our results also lend little support to claims of strong negative
eﬀects from opponents. This is true even though the reform implemented a fully mandated
program aﬀecting families that did not voluntarily enroll their children, and who would
otherwise care for their children themselves. It should be noted, however, that these
estimates are driven mostly by children from relatively lower socioeconomic backgrounds,
and may not be representative for children from higher socioeconomic backgrounds.
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A Appendix
Table A1: School performance and enrollment in kindergarten by family income decile at
age five, children born in 1990.
Decile Family income School performance Enrollment in kindergarten
1 15,912 (12,640) 3.42 (1.00) 0.54 (0.50)
2 45,124 (4,462) 3.53 (0.98) 0.65 (0.48)
3 57,408 (2,962) 3.60 (0.97) 0.72 (0.45)
4 66,968 (2,576) 3.68 (0.97) 0.82 (0.38)
5 75,547 (2,380) 3.73 (0.95) 0.88 (0.33)
6 83,524 (2,271) 3.79 (0.93) 0.91 (0.29)
7 91,695 (2,462) 3.86 (0.95) 0.92 (0.27)
8 101,363 (3,249) 4.02 (0.93) 0.93 (0.26)
9 116,100 (5,757) 4.11 (0.91) 0.93 (0.26)
10 169,179 (90,272) 4.30 (0.89) 0.92 (0.27)
Notes: This table corresponds to figure 1. School performance is measured as the average exam performance at end of
compulsory schooling (age 16). Enrollment in kindergarten is measured at age five. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table A2: Robustness – High school drop out
Sample Post Coeﬀ SE N
A. Key specification check
Placebo 1989–1990 1990 -0.001 (0.007) 110,171
B. Treatment-specific trends
Extended sample 1988–1991 1991 0.013 (0.005) 218,485
Linear trend 1988–1991 1991 0.011 (0.009) 218,485
Quadratic trend 1988–1991 1991 0.019 (0.023) 218,485
C. Flexible trends
Trend × covar 1988–1991 1991 0.005 (0.006) 213,472
Year FE × covar 1988–1991 1991 0.008 (0.006) 213,472
D. Other
1st diﬀ.: Treatment 1990–1991 1991 0.017 (0.007) 18,108
1st diﬀ.: Comparison 1990–1991 1991 0.004 (0.003) 93,288
Notes: Column 2 gives the estimation sample. In all estimations, Postt = 1 for t is given in Column 3. In Panel A
estimation is based on OLS on equation (1). In Panel B, estimations are based on equation (1), including a linear (row
2) and a quadratic (row 3) treatment-specific trend. In Panel C, estimations are based on equation (1), including a linear
trend (row 1) or cohort dummies (row 2) interacted with a set of baseline covariates (school size; mother’s and father’s
education level; municipal income; urban area). In rows 1 and 2 of Panel D, estimations are based on equation (2), while
row 3 is based on equation (3). The controls are listed in table 2 and the dependent variables are defined in section 4.
Standard errors (SE) are robust for heteroskedasticity and all models include municipality fixed eﬀects.
Table A3: Robustness – Academic track
Sample Post Coeﬀ SE N
A. Key specification check
Placebo 1989–1990 1990 -0.003 (0.008) 105,894
B. Treatment-specific trends
Extending pre-reform 1988–1992 1991–92 -0.002 (0.005) 258,112
Linear trend 1988–1992 1991–92 -0.008 (0.009) 258,112
Quadratic trend 1988–1992 1991–92 -0.018 (0.011) 258,112
C. Flexible trends
Trend × covar 1988–1992 1991–92 0.006 (0.005) 252,495
Year FE × covar 1988–1992 1991–92 0.003 (0.005) 252,495
D. Other
1st diﬀ.: Treatment 1990–1991 1991 -0.019 (0.007) 17,203
1st diﬀ.: Comparison 1990–1991 1991 -0.011 (0.003) 90,504
Delayed eﬀect 1988–1992 1991 -0.009 (0.006) 258,112
1992 0.007 (0.007)
Notes: Column 2 gives the estimation sample. In all estimations, Postt = 1 for t is given in Column 3. In Panel A
estimation is based on OLS on equation (1). In Panel B, estimations are based on equation (1), including a linear (row
2) and a quadratic (row 3) treatment-specific trend. In Panel C, estimations are based on equation (1), including a linear
trend (row 1) or cohort dummies (row 2) interacted with a set of baseline covariates (school size; mother’s and father’s
education level; municipal income; urban area). In rows 1 and 2 of Panel D, estimations are based on equation (2), while
row 3 is based on equation (3). The controls are listed in table 2 and the dependent variables are defined in section 4.
Standard errors (SE) are robust for heteroskedasticity and all models include municipality fixed eﬀects.
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Figure A1: Enrollment – tax data and administrative data
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